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ABSTRACT
Environmental factors whioh bave lmp.ded actirlty In
the Arcttc, in the past, remain slgnlrtcant barriers to the
development or the Northwest Passage. Consequ.ntly,
enormous oapital as well •• bilateral planning and cooper-
atton between United States and CanadIan publio and private
agencies .111 be required if significant pro~e88 18 to be
achieved.
The re.ource wealth of the Arctic proml••s the eeonomlc
inoentives es.enttal to the even~lal development or a tran.-
portatlon system to permit explo'tatfon or theae re.ources.
1.'he economtc potential or Alaakan 01.1 motivated the Arcttc
tanker test or the S.S. Manhattan, an alMost purely private
venture. Thl. teat demonstrated the engineerins feasibIlity
of penetrating an ••••nti.lly ice-covered deep water thor-
oughfare, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific, .1th larp'e
commeroial surrace ves8els. Establt.hlng economic feasI-
bility will be lIlUoh more difficult.
Development or a commercially rea8fble Northwest PassaR.
1. both eoonomioally and strategically desirable. How8ver,
imm8nse physical and eng1neerlng problems rema1n to be
solved. Tn addition to severe envIronmental challenpes and
the requi'reftlent t"or large public and pri vat. capt tal co","1 t-
ment t9 the need for operable pollution control procedures
11
to proteot the delicate Arctic ecology. Pbrthermo~.,
sensitive legal and politteal problema need to be .atts-
raetor1ly resolved. All thea. factors 8u~~e.t the early
formulation or a bilateral planning and coordlnat'on
"Council" to resolve mutual proble.a and optimize limited
resources.
ltl
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CHAPTER I
IJIlTRODUCTrOtf
In 1968 the private oil industry of the United States
discovered crude 011 deposits on the North Slope or Alaska
believed to be the larp,est all field deposit tn North
America. Lying entirely within the harsh environment be-
yond the Aretlc Circle this area has been essentially
Inaeeesslble except by air. The difficulties and potential
eost or developin~ a transportation system necessitated
extenslve investigation into competitIve methods of trans-
portlnF thl. otl to eastern United States' markets.
One method considered potentially feaatble was by larFe
lee-breaking tanker through the historically difficult and
inhospitable Northwest Pa88a~e. Tht. method promised
~r.ater economies than a trans-Canadian-United Stetes pipe-
lIne .hloh poses unique and expensive probleMS. Aecord-
tnpt,., an operat10nal test '.nvolvlng an tee-breaker tanker
was considered e8sential 1n order to establish the eeonomic
feaslbility of developinp, a year-round tanker operation.
The S.8. Manhattan successrully transited the Nopth-
west Pa••ape in both direotions between 24 August and 14
November 1969. The tranal t focused internat10nal attentt OD
on the key locatIon or the Arettc as a trade route for
internatIonal commerce and attmulated an awareness or the
1
implioit potential for the exploitatIon of the vast mIneral
resouroe. 01' the Canadian Arctic.
Concurrently. l.portant and complex questions of'
natIonal and international slgnifioanoe were raised. It Is
the purpose of this stu~ to examine the transit. Ita
slpnlfioanoe In pioneerln~ an eoonomically teasible 9ystem
for the exploitation of Arotio resouroes and the inherent
national and internattonal eoonomic, le~al-polltical and
strategio implications In the eventual development of. an
international route for surface maritime oommeroe. This
venture generated an unusual number or periodical articles
and publio speculations of varying degrees or us.rulness.
Because or oonstraints or apace many detail. bave neoessar-
ily been ellmtnated In favor of a broad examination of the
complex problem. involved.
An apolop:y must be ofrered f"or the two charta included
at Appendix T. They are the only one. readIly avallabl.
through the grapbio art. divIsion of the Naval War College
without r ••ortinF to expensive photographic reduction.
Whil. inadequate in detsil they do suftice to generally
orient the reader.
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CHAPTER TI
FACTORS nICH RAVE LIMITED DEVRLOPMFtf'1'
Historical Analysis. "!he near route to the Far East Is
north". 1 Ouided by this maxim and motivated by the riches
of the ortent neorly every probe or the Arcttc or sub-
Arctic up to the 18th Century w.s financed by merchants.
These men, lIke the sponsors of the Manhattan test, were
primarily interested in the potential profits promised by
the establishment of shorter trade routes. The extreme
rigors encountered by the early voyagers convinced ~lropean
merchants that even if' a Morthwest Passage existed and
could be successfully negot1.a.ted the route W88 too hazard-
ous to be economical.
R.tions tnterested In overaeas expansion and the
Canadian fur trade continued to encoura~. voyages tbrou~h
the 18th C~ntury. These excursions provided the stimulus
for systematic study by increasIng numbers of scientists
and geographers Who helped map the Arctic Islands.
'fhe cha11eng8 of conqutltr1ng the lce and the search for
knowledpe oontinued to motivate expedlt10ns throup,h the
19th Century. It was not until the beg1nntn,. or the ~Oth
1Vl1hjalmur Stefansaon, Worth.eat to FOrtune, (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pieroe, 1958), p. 46.
Century, In 1906, that the Rorw~~lan explorer Roald Amundsen
climaxed four centuries or exploratt on by suceeas fully
1 •
navigating the passape during 8 three-year voyage In the 47
ton herring sloop Ojoa. 2 Even this hi8tor~c voyage was of
minor praotical signifioanoe because the route he followed
skirts the continental land mass, Is studded with islands
and shoals and 18 limited 1n places to depths of 5-6 fathoms.
The route followed b,. the Manhattan (See Chart I,
Appendix T) was first negotiated by 8 deep draft vessel,
the Canadian Ice-breaker Labrador, In 1954. ThIs route,
called ~he Parry Channel, divides the Canadian Arctic
Ielands and is the onl,. navigable route for deep draft
vesse18. It 1s divided at its western end by Banks Island
where the relattve1,. narrow Prince or Wales Strait passes
to the south. The first vessel to transit the ~ntire lenpth
or the more dtfrl~llt McClure Strait north of Banks Island
W8S the USCG tce-breaker Northwlnd. The UBS Seadrsgon
extensively Bounded Parry Channel and MoClure Strait durtn~
s submerged transit in 1960. 3
Perttnent Features or the Region. The main Canadian
Arctic Islands are 500.000 square miles in area Rnd 11e
2Frneet S. Dodge, Northwest bZ Sea, (New York: Ox~ord,
Oxrord Untv. Press, 1911), for chronological history.
30eorge P. Ste~le, SEADRAGON North.est Under the Ice,
(New York: Dutton 1962), p. 185-188.
4
entirely within the Arotlc olimatic region. 4 As prevtou8ly
noted theae tslands are divided into two prIncipal pal'te by
the Parry Channel. The waters of the 81"8a 8re covered by a
mantle of sea ice for at 1.8.t seven months of the year.
Initial freeze-up occurs In all the ooast81 waters by mid
September and the Fenersl break-up and d18onar,e or the Ice
In the eastern end does not take place before late June or
early July. Break-Up begIns In ar••• of weak lee coneen-
tratt on and expand. outward rrom these centers dur' ng the
summer. Unl1ke the polar pack there 18 little movement of
10e during the winter and very irregular drlft 1n summer.
The circulation through thie .ystem Is weak and appears to
be Inrluenced by the circulatory systems or the Arcttc
Ocean, Bafftn Bay and Hudson Strait. The dominant mov8ment
of "ater 18 eaeterly through the Borrow Stratt--Lanoaster
Sound passage. The Parry Ohannel .ystem ~orm. a transitIon
zone between the .at8rl to the west, oharaoteristic of the
Polar Basin, and tho.e to the e6at tha tare f'ormed throu¢t
an 1ntftrohange or Arcttc "ater w1.th that or the west Oreen-
land current In Baffin Bay.S
5
At its minimum, durIng the third quarter of the year,
the ice reoedes up to Point Barrow and above, and open
water oould be encountered anywhere along a route from the
Atlantic throup'.h Parry Channel and on to Point Barrow. Tn
practioe, however, Bny continuous transit would encounter
substantial movlnR 10e even during this minImum 10e period.
The maximum thickness of annual plate lee over the
route is 6-7 teet and the maximum thiokness of multi-year
10e 18 about ten feet. The heaviest or thickest ice occurs
during the April through May period prior to start of the
melt season. At the maximum lee period, 10e rld~es or 20
foot depths or greater, rormed by deformation of ice, could
eover 15-25 percent of the 8urrace In 80me are.8. WhIle
little is known conoerning these rldFea, ava11able evidenoe
indIcates that the underwater portion, 4/5 of the total
ridge depth, has a strength of about 30 peroent of the sur-
faoe 10e. While the majority of the r1dp:es alonp the route
are in the ranFe of 30-foot depth, ooeaslonal ridFes up to
100 feet deep may be enoountered. The deeper rld~e8 may be
reoognized and partially avoided in order to .pe~d transit
time. Bowever, 1t 1s elear that any vessel making continu-
ous pro~reB8 throu~h the passaF.e must be capable of
negotiatin~ ice ridges, sametime. in rapid Bucces81on. 6
6Walter I. Wittman, Head Sea Ioe Branch, Nav7 Ooean-
ographic Orrice, Unpublished Planning Data for Arctic Tanker
Test,dated 6 Dec. 1968.
6
The system of Channels bp,tween the Arettc Islands
presents a d1stInet1y difrerent picture than the polar 10e
pock which is continuouslY' in motton. The larger straits
wIll not freeze over entirely, but w111 be oloPFed by heavy
drirt 10e ~om the Arct10 Ocean. Because or the physicsl
oonstraints Imposed by shoreB.nes, tremendous forces are
exerted by wind and current. Ice scientists are now oon-
vineed that there Is little question of the ability of
larFe vessels to "crack" lee up to 100 feet thiok. Sowever,
more reaearch is required into the dynamios of 10e movements,
both the tremendous pressurea induced by wind and current
and the magnItude of foroe required to 'Move lee aslde enee
It is broken.
An immensely expanded program of engineering researoh
wIll be required 1.n the next several years. Problems of
lar~e ship struotural requirements, power requIrements,
least hasardou8 and moat economic routings, mooring requlre-
menta and pollutIon hazards must all ba studIed. ActivIties
suoh 88 the neWly expanded Naval Arettc R~a~arch Laboratory
(NARL) at Pt. Barrow, Alaaka and the Army Cold ReFton.
Resenrch and EngIneering Laboratory at Hanover, N.H •• wIll
assume increased importanoe In such a proF,rem.
7
CHAPTER TII
MANBATTAtf TRANSIT OF 'ME PASSAGE
Planning Oonsiderattona. The Prudhoe Bay discovery
was made at an opportune time. Oil produotion in the
continental United States wIll peak In the early 1970's
and then begin to decltne. On the basia or the needs of
the United States eoonomy and the potential of the north
slope plans are being made for a total flow of two million
barrel. per day by 1980. The bulk of this flow 1Ift1st move
to the 011 defioient eastern United Statea in same eoonomic
manner and begin doing 80 by 197? Alternatives oon.lder~d
inoluded a pipeline acrOS8 Panama and movement by Nuclear
Submarine Tankers. The choIce narrowed down to a pipeline
across the northePn part or North Amerl ca or tankers
through the Korth.e.t Passage. 1 The deciston to build an
aoo m\Ie trans-Alaska pipeline s1stem ('1'APS) f'rom Prudhoe
Bay to the Ice free port of Valdez was made in February
1969. 2 However, this multiple user raoility wIll carry oil
to the western United States and ha. Itttle or no erreat on
a decision concerning movement to the eaat coast. Because
1
-The 011 and the Ioe". Varine Enpineering/Log •
• ov8mb8~ 1969. p. 66.
SLee Corkill. "Pipeline Across Alaska", The Rumble Wax.
Third Quarter 1969, p. 23.
e
of the complex problema or oonstruction In permafrost, cost
est~ate8 oontinue to e8calate and this project faoes
serious enfl!.neering and polItical problems.
Nuclear submarIne tankers wh!.ch would move 011 under
the lc~ have not been discarded as an eventual possibility.
Such .. 8ystem would elimInate some or the problema ot sur-
faoe transportation and, in spite of' its cost, oould con-
ceivably become competitive with projeoted pIpeline syetems. 3
However, one or the principal problems 18 the unoertalnty
of providtng an operational system In the time rrame required.
The primary factor favoring a surrace marine .yet_ was
an •• timated 40¢--60¢ per barrel cost saving. Industry
planners estimated that at planned production levels through
1980 the value of tuture savings over a 20-year project life
.as about .1.2 billion after tax. AssumIng t.st costs
oou1d be written off over a two-year perIod the value ratio
or potential benefits to cost .as estimated to be about
140/1."
Models of a "Wind" 01a88, Dest~ ¥-13, and Manhattan
ice-breaker tanker were evaluated at the navy model toe test
tanka of the U.S. Wavy Undereea Warfare lab in San 01.e,,0,
SftThe Oil and the Ioe", p. 71 and "Nuclear Subs UrFed.
to Move Alaskan Oil", Providenoe Journal, 17 Deo. 1969, p. 2~
·Stanley B. Haae, Unpublished Arctic Tanker T~et Planning
Memorandum, dated 6 Dec. 1988.
\)
Oal1 r. One-twent!,eth (1/20) scale model. of' "WYNn" 01as8
and "super tanker" (250,000 ton) lee breakers were tested
ln natural 10e on a fre8h water lake ln tM S.18. Alp. at
Orenob1e, Franoe. Theee model tests correlated well with
oomputer studies based on U.S. Coast Guard ea1~11ationa
and indioated that the plate ioe anticipated would repre-
sent no serious obstacle for a 250,000 DWT ioe-breaker
tanker wIth a power plant of 60,000 SRP or larger. However,
an operational test W8. oonsidered e.sential to verlfy the
validity or math and model test IndtoRtlons. 5
~eot Support. Once the dect8ion ..s made to prooeed
with an operational test it became necessary to solicit the
assistance or the U.S. Raval Ooeanographio orrice, the U.S.
Department of Transportation (United States Coast Guard)
and the Canadian Department or Transportat10n (M.teorolo"ical
Branch) to prov1.de the environmental data required. These
ap8noi.8 represented the prlno1pa1 unique expertise avail-
able on ice conditIons, 8ea lee behav1or. 10e roreoa.ting,
ice physics, remote sensors and Ima£8~y interpretation.
Additionally each of thes. agencies waa requested to 8upp1y
"such support asalatanee as th~ ml~t be able to render."e
5
"The Great Arottc Gamble". Surveyor, Au,uat 1969, p. 6.
6Letter from Chairman or the Board, Rumble 011 and
Refining Co. to Secretary of the Navy dated 20 February 1989.
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While no federal subsidies were provided the•• agencies
contributed vary.1ng degrees or support. The NBval Oceano-
graphIc ofrice provIded environmental data for pre-test
plannIng, instructIon In lee condItIons for ke7 crfllw members,
diverted regularly soheduled ice reconnalssanoe flights for
pre-teat ooverage of the route and provided an on-board
imagery Interpreter during the transIt. The United State8
Coast Guard provIded an lee-breaker escort (whIch wa8 forced
to wI thdraw due to an engineoaaualty), a CaptaIn wIth
loe-breaker experience a8 on-board oblerver for the trsnsit
and 80me on-Icene .1ee reconnalsRsnce fllRhts. Armyts Cold
RegIons Research and En~tneer1ng Laboratory provided several
le8 scientists for the teet. The Canadian Department of
Tran8portation provIded an toe-breaker escort, an experI-
enoed lee Captain 8S observer, on-8cene ice reconD.iBsanoe
throughout the transit and loe observtn~ and forecasting
support through lee foreoast Central at Halifax, lova Sootia.
Test Vehicle and ObjectIves. The Manhattan was seleoted
for thIs test because she was the largest, newest and most
heaVily constructed 1n the UnIted States flag fleet. With
twin sorews and 43,000 SHP she wes by far the most powerful
commercial veBsel available. Her conversIon for loe-breaking
service by ~lve separate shipyards from Matne to Mississippi.
hBS been extenst ve17 reported 1n per!. odt calliterature. This
"crash" project. con81sted of at'Jding an 10ft-breaking bow, a
11
slopinR ice belt along the hull, machinePi 0011181.on chocks,
hull strengthening around the engtne room, specially
deslpned serews 22 feet 1n diameter, new tail shafts,
general internal hull strengthening and proteotive shielding
for the rudders. At one time 10,000 shipyard personnel were
working on the project. A total of ~.5 million man hours
were expended. Enough additional steel was placed 'n the
ship to build a 50,000 otT tanker. 7 Thi. projeot 18 indeed
a tribute to the effeotiveness of industry planning and
coordination.
The replacement or the existing bow by a newly
construoted 65 foot ioe-breaker bow construoted on the
"M.!.T." or "White" principle warrants rurther comment.
This new shape has it. origin In a dootoral study oompleted
at M.l.T. 1n 1965 by Roderick M. White, who 1s now Ohief of
the Applied Engineering Section of the USCG Aoademy. The
new bow, shaped like a giant soimitar, moves the vessel
into the ice at an 18 degree angle before increasing to the
more oonventional 30 degrees. The shallow forward an~le
F,lves 8 lar~e sustained roroo on the toe durIng ramming,
while 8 relatively small peak load is ~xerted on the ship.
After the bow hes ridden up on the 10e, the l8r~er angle
7
nThe 011 and the Ice", p. 66.
12
makes it less difficult to back out. Previou8 to White,
the 01aesl0 work on the mathematics of ramming was that of
a Russian, I.V. V1nogradov 1n 1946.8 ThSs bow reportedly
functtoned verry ef:reottvel,. and .tll probably be the design
employed in any new construction ice-breaker tanker.
Init!al planning for the operattonal phase wae predi-
cated on oompletion of sh1p oonversion by earl,. Ma,. In
order to enter Parry Channel about 1 June. Thie might have
permitted the colleotton ot adequate data in heavy ice to
4 ~
preclude 8 return i.n 1970 to accaapllsh test obj eet!. vee.
In addition to establlshlng major design parameters for a
ftrst generation or toe-breakIng tankerl apec1ftc test
objectives included the establtshment of:
- optimum speed-horsepower oombin-
attons through uniform lee thick-
neBS.
- vess.l performance through ridge
oondl ti one.
- forces, accelerattons, mottons
and impact loads on vess8l In
varIous lce oonditions.
- the maneuvering oapab!lity of ~.
long parallel hull tanker fora. 9
Phlstcal Description or the Northwes' Pas sase. As indi-
oated prevl~18l1 the route followed by Manhattan provides
8_ I oe Crusher for the Northwest Passage", T&chnoloSl
ReView, October-November 1969, p. 70-71.
9Raas , "Plann\ng Memorendu.". 6 D8cember 1968.
1&
the only practioal deep draft thoroughfare oonnecting the
Atlantic and Pacific tbrou~b the CanadIan Arctto Islands.
In order to gain a better understanding of the operational
problem and later d1scus81ona of leg.l--politioal oonslder-
ations an examination or this route In some detail 1s
warranted.
Keeping close to the west aoast of Greenland to take
advantage of the relatively ioe-tree .aters here during the
summer montha the route passes through Davis Strait, dis-
covered by John Davia 1n 1585. Trans1ting asrtln Bay,
Which was first saIled by William Beffln in 1616, the route
enters Lanoaster Sound, a180 looated by Baftin, whIch is
the aotual entrance to the Horthwe.t Pas8a~e.
Laneaster sound Is a wide strait of at least 35 mt1.s
unt1.1 it reaches Prince Leopold Island where it narrows to
about 25 miles. Barrow StraIt, one of the four straits
forming Parry Channel, 18 the only one with a small group
of islands in the middle; this strait 1. narrowed to about
15 mile. by the presence of Young Island on the south and
Lowther lsland on the north. The route then wIdens through
Viscount Melville Sound to more than 75 ml1ea before reaoh-
ing MoClure Strait. Edward Parry, in 1819, reached within
el,~t of Banke Island, whlch dtvide. McClure and Prince of
Walee StraIts, before being stopped by the ioe.
Navigatton oonditions are generally more favorable along
14
the eastern half of the route and deteriorate when approach-
Ing MoC1ure Strait which generally remains cnoked, with lce,
driven by the wind, trom the Beaufort Sea. The PrInce ot
W.1es Strait to the southweat Is generally 1es8 difficult,
being protected tram the Ice by Banka Island. The northern
entrance of this strait is just over 11 mile. wide and
narrows slightly until d1v'ded In half by Prince Royal
Tsland, leaVing a passage of fIve miles on either aide.
Only the southem passage 1a sare1y navigable due to 11m1t-
tng depths of two fathoms in the Channel north of' Prince
ROJ'.l Island. 1O '!'he 1"oute then widens to Its 8outhe:rn
entrance whloh 1. 25 mIl•• aero•• and paa.es into Amundsen
Gulf, whioh 18 over 50 mile. wide. 'l'he route then proceeds
along the mainland coast where 10e oonditions are generally
dependent on the wind and 10e movements 1n the Beaufort Sea.11
When Manhattan arrived at Banks Island, Prince of Wales
Strait waa near17 free of lee and since there was time
avatlable 1n the schedule, a probe ot MoC1ure Strait wa.
attempted In order to gather data in more difficult lee.
Here the ship became entrapped within an eight mile floe for
10Canad1.an H7dro@raphic S8r'vtce Cha!'t #7091, Prince of'
Wa1ee and McClure Strait, Ju1J' 12, 1963, Scale 1:500,000.
11A. Donat Pharand, "Innocent Passage in the Arctic",
The Canadian Yearbook of Intel"natlonal Law 1968, p. 50.
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nearly two day. and .a. oarrled 2-S miles before being
h'eed. Thill dela,. nece8sitated a return to 1T1nce or Wa18.
Strait In order to insure meeting 8cheduled oommitments at
Prudhoe Bay, although the trip through Prince of Wales
Strait Is 350 mtl•• lon"er than through the more northerly
McClure Strait. Experlenoed observers aboard are conv1,noftd
thet WoClure Strait could have been Bucces.tully negotiated
by avoiding the larger tce floes. 12
Evaluation of Transit. In terms of test objective. the
transit must be considered sucoessrul. A tremendous amount
of data was obtained whioh 18 still being evaluated. Th.
ship performed very .ell and was more maneuverable tban
anticipated. St.ering control w.a maintained In the ic.
and ship oontrol was Fenerally good. The Fr••test poten-
tIal d.n~er i8 beooming "locked In" within a large floe and
being carried .~ound. tndulltry repr•••nt.tiv~8 believe
that with an additional 25 peroent more power the Manhattan
would not have beoome "looked In" even in "CC1UN Stra1t. 1&
The ship sustained a hole in the bull or 15 by 30 feet, ~16
feet art of the bow, on the starboard aIde and below the
12F.A. Goettel, Senior U.S. Coast Guard Ob8erYer, Tele-
phone Interview, S Deoember 1969.
lST.J. ~son. General Manager Humble Marine Operationa,
Brtefing to Naval Officera, Pentagon, 5 November 1969.
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lee belt. While industry offioials caution against drawing
any conclusion. trom this it does help to substantiate 8
requirement for double hull construction in tankers designed
for Arctic .ervice 1n order to reduce pollution rieks.
Data of a teohnical, or even semi-technical nature,
that hasn't been released to the publIc throup:h the variou8
media, is being oonsidered proprietary. Industrr sponsors
of the test are hopeful that the data gathered and its
application to the design of a new, large ioe-breaking
tanker will plece them in a competitive position warranting
the high researoh expenditures. 1•
Most observers are cautiousll optimistic. They believe
• year-round operation is feasible provided suffioient cap-
ital i8 oommitted to Oonst~10t the large powerfUl vessels
required and the support facilt ties whioh 1'111 be essential.
Establtshing economto feasibility is a more difficult
proposition. One 10e scientist, who made th8 transit, i.
convinced that 10e charaoteristics during the more diffIcult
February--March per10d are suff1elentl1 dlrrerent to warrant
further testing under these conditIons before a deciston
can be made. 15 Others believe tbat Apr11-_May oonstitutes
14~.J. PUson, Humble, Personal Oorrespondence dated 29
September, 1989.
15auenther E. Frankenstein, Res.aroh Civil Engineer,
U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory,
Pre.entation at Unlv. of Rhode Ia1and. 8 Dec. 1969.
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the mOlt dirficult period. While weather oonditions have
moderated by this time lce cont1.nues to "grow" Into May.
Extensive 10e r-econnatssanoe and evaluat1.on 8S well as
the .ervices or ice-breaking escorts wIll be essential to
any year-round operation. While the use of floodllF.hts
provAd adequate 1"01" ship oontrol during hours of darkness
the extended hours or diminished natural illumination dur1ng
the wtnter months may ser1oo811 hamper adequate ioe reoon-
nalssanee during that sea80n.
It 18 widely oonoeded that AU~lBt--September provide.
the least dirficult condtt1ons. Conaequentl1. the extent
to which a transit during this per10d aotually demonstrated
userul evidence of year-round f'easlb11ity 18 ser10usly
questioned.
IndustJ"7 officials are ourrently planning to conduot
fUrther tests in May. Indications are that theBe tests will
be oonduoted in Bafnn Bay in the vioini ty of Bylot Island
Bnd that no penetratt on further west than Resolute will be
attempted. Such a teat 18 oonsidered by lee soientists aa
unlikely to produoe more oonolustve evidence than that
already accumulated.
Without detraoting from the operational aohievement it
1. d\ftioult to ignore the fact that. aside from a modest
engineerinF advanoement in tee-breaking techniques, this
tranltt could have been performed 8 decade or more ago, from
18
a purely technological point of view, had the economic
inoentlves existed.
One or the most difficult problems facing planners In
the d.velopm~nt or any Arcttc transportation system .111 be
the recruitment, training, motivation and retention or
qualified personnel. Motivation and retentton could prove
to be particularly troub1~some in view of the rigors of the
envIronment. The following statement by an enpineer with
the Institute of Arcttc Environmental Enp:tnf'ler1n~ at the
University or Alaska, 8ummer1.zes the difficulty or antici-
patIng future problems, "engineering experIence shows that
when a new venture of thi. uniqueness initially becomes
operational, unanttcl.pated, significant problema arise and
the previous1,. anticipated problems becOllle dwarfed 1n
signifioance •••• LI-7ven the psychological factors
1nvo1ved in the operation of extremely large ships under
unbe1t.veb1~ adverl. weather and ice oondItions during
virtual11 continuous night should also prove to be bound-
1ess1T e~cltlng."16
16Char1es E. Behlke "Arctic En~lneerlng for the
Seventies: a Phl1080PhJ', ARCTIC, Journal or the Arcttc
Institute or Borth America, §eptember 1969. p. 313-314.
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC I\fPLICATTONS
Because ot their importance the economic implications
whloh abound In the development of an economIcally feasible
route for surface commeroe will undoubtedly dominate devel-
opments tn the legal--politteal and strategio areas of
interest. While oil Is not the only consideration it is
the eS8ential element in present d.ve1opments and the
realities oreated bY' its dominant position dictate oonslder-
atton in some detaIl.
Exploration by Federal Agenctes followtng the ~lrchas.
or Ala8ka 1n 1867 revealed natural oil seeps and slp;ns of
lerRe hydrocarbon deposits on the north slope. In 1923 a
~7,OOO square-mile area coverin~ most of the slopets
western half was aet aside as Naval Petroleum Res.rve no. 4.
Exploration by the Nav,r .rrom 1944 through 1953 disolosed s1x
Bubstantial gas fields, but the few 011 f1elds disoovered
were amall. However, considerable knowledge on conducting
large-scale engineering enterprises 1n the Arctic was
aoquired. Pbllowlng 10 lears or private .~ploratlon the
largest strike tn Worth Amerioa W88 made near Prudhoe 8&7
in 1968. 1 Estimates range from 10-40 billion barrels in
lLuther J. Carter, "Borth Slope: Oil Ruah", Science,
3 October 1969, p. 86-87.
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this area alone which 1. on~ of about twenty equally premis-
ing ~eolo~10 structures in Alaaka. The impact upon the
United States economy may not be fully Bsse.sed for years
to come and the oonsequences or these discoveries are
difficult to roresee. 2
W!thout thts discovery the United States would have
developed a serious shortAge or orude oil. Proven domestic
reserves had fallen to a ten year aupply. Most interior
continental fields are past their prime and production 1n
Oallfornia, Louislana and Tex.s .,11 peak In the lat.
aeventies. Aocordingly, productlon wIll ~ro. slowly from
9.1 mIllion barrels. day In 1968 to 9.5 ml1110n barrels in
1980. Average dally consumption in th.e ollme pertod will
olimb trom 12.9 to 18.2 mIllion barrels 8 day, swelling the
U.S. deficit from 3.8 to 8.7 mll110n barrels. day. The
United States raced the prospect or importing 50 percent ot
it. needs by 1980. !he only alternattve would have been to
art11'1clally fix the pr1.ce of 011 at about $4.50 per barrel,
OOl1'lpared wl.th about $3.00 today, 1n order to boost pro-
ductIon fram high cost wells, 011 shale and coal.
While enormous amounts or oapita1 are required to
develop the Alaskan fields, w9l1a are expeoted to produce
2n•R. Kaplan, "'l'he Ep1 e Voyage of the M'anha ttan", !h!.
Review, Sept., Oct. 1969, p. 23.
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15--20,000 barrel. per day as campared with the ayerage
U.S. well whioh produces 15.2 barrels a day. Wellhead coata
or fl.OO to 1.20 per barrel are being estimated for North
Slope oil which i8 far greater than for Middle East 011.
Added to this the cost or trom 80' to $1.00 per barrel by
pipeline transport, the potential saVing or 40¢--80¢ per
barrel by surfaoe tanker beoomes indeed significant.
Beoause of the high cost of produotion and transport North
Slope oil Is not lIkely to sell outside the United States.
MIddle East 011 sella In Japan and Canada for about $1.50
per barrel. Horth Slope oil could not .ell at a competitive
price.
If the Canadian Arctic proves to contsin large quanti-
ties of 011 it wtll a180 be hlF~-prioed 011, difficult to
market outside Worth AmerIca. However, by the mid-1970's
ten b111ion barrels will repre.ent only 2 ,ears domestic
consumption in the United States. COft8.~lent17, the United
States 18 the most lIkely eventual market for Canadian 011
as gell.S
It Is b~yond the scope of thIs study to analyze the
complex policy issues gov~rntng the production and daBe8tic
distribution of petroleum products. The petroleum industry
SJeremy Matn, "The Hot 011 Rush In Arcttc Alaska",
Fortune, April 1969, p. 122-124.
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Is not oompetitive in the usual sense. The damesttc prioe
of crude 011 Is partially insulated tram competltion by
restrlotions enforced by government on both domestic and
foreign supply. Protection r.rom forelgn sources 1s seoured
by mandatory Import quots. enforced by tne federal govern-
ment. Theae polioi•• are based on the prem! •• that
unlimi ted imports of loW' cost fore! gn oil wQUld endanfter
nattona1 security by driving the domestl0 price down too
sharply, making the United States too dependent on foreign
011 supplies. Scrapping of the import quota system in favor
of' a preferential tariff meohanism bas been advocated.
'!'art rts would be set so that very low oos, .i dd1e 'Eastern
oil, somewhat higher prioed Venesue1an 011 and still higher
prioed U.S. domestic ot1 would sell tor sbout the 8ame prIce
at East Coast porta. 4 ~lnal resolution or this proposal may
seriously impact on industry deoisions re~ardlng the trans-
port or Alaskan oil.
If the Northwest PaBsage proves commerc!all1 feaalble
impact on the United States' Bhlpbu11dlnp. industry eould be
substantIal sinee a federel statute known es the Jones Act
prohibits the transportation or ~ood8 in foreign built
vessels between American porta. Under the aurrent planning
4Mcablnet Group Asks Scrapping of 011 Quotas". Washington
Post Ne•• ServIce, The Providence Journal, 18 Dec. 1969, p.16:1.
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raoto~ or one tanker per 500,000 barrels of demand and a
"turn around" t1me of 30 to 40 days tt has been estimated
that up to thirty 250,000 DIT tankftrs may be requIred by
1980. A similar potential exIsts In th~ transport or
liqu~fied natural gas (LNG). The potentIal supplies of
Alaskan natural ~as may exceed 400 tri1110n cubic feet.
In liquefied form it takes less than l/eOotb of the space
it oocupies in its natural form. Technology 1s such that
It can be transported tn tankers especially desIgned to
maintain the desired temperature of minus 258 degrees
Pahrenhel t. Alaskan gas J.8 alre~dy being exported to
Japan by this meana. 5
The development or surfaoe commeroe on this acale would
make possible the exploitation of tremendous mineral
resources within the Oanadian Arcttc. Tn th1s event the
entire ps.ttern of world t~Bde could be elFn1 f1 oantly
altered. The Canadian Arcttc Is essentially equidistant
from New York, London and Tokyo. (See Chart 2, Appendix I)
The Northwest Pa8sage takes on added sl~nlrio.nce when
one considers the unoertainties in con8tructing the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). Although delivery 18 being
5nAla8ka Resources and the Jones Act", Senate COngres8-
10nal Record, Novftmber 12, 1969, p. SI4163.§1416i.
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taken on 48 Inch ateel pipe from Japan and politteal
obstacles to granting a right of .8Y have been e1eared away,
physical obstacles rema1n formIdable. SOMe conservatIonist
groups are opposed to its oonstruction because of potentIal
pollution problems. The oonstruction diffioulties, whether
1nsu1ated and buried in the permafrost or elevated to esoape
permafrost problems are tremendous. 6
ComplIcating the feasibility of a marine operation,
however, 1s the monumental task of constructing docking or
loading faoi1ities on Alaska's north ooast. The extensive
oontinentsl shelf creates limiting depths even more
restriotive than the Perstan 0u1f. The Manhattan, w1th a
draft of 52 feet, anchored 35 mIles ort Prudhoe Bay. A
closAr approach .as posstble, but onl7 about six miles
closer. The 250,000 DWT tankers being oontemp1ated .111
draw about 65 feet. Rven wi. th adequate soundings fa c111 t1 8S
.111 have to be const:ruoted at 1Hat 20 mlles 01"1' the coast.
Furthermore, th1.s 18 In an area where "the heavy polar Ice
pack 18 never far off the coast and can advance onto the
7
shore at any time". The rinal form for a suitable year
round fae111 ty has not yet been de.flned. Conoentrated
8Carter, Sci.nol, p. 90.
7U•S• Navy Hydrographic offIce, Oceanographic At1•• of
£he Polar Seas, Part II Arctic, Washington, D.C., p. 4'.
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studtes and model testing are underway. While con8truction
Is cons1.dered feasible. esttmates range from $150-500 million
which 1s more than the average United Stetes port has
1.nvested in all its facilitles. 8 Storage problema and the
high construction costs or the tankers required would pre-
clude the consideration of a summer 8eason only operatton.
In summary it seems 10g1.oal to assert that estimates
ot both the potential value of Arctic resources and the coat
of their exploitation will oontinue to escalate .s addition-
al knowledge la acquired. The most recently reported
estimate or cost of th$ two alternatives of t2-3 billion for
an ice-breaker tanker .Y8tem and $3-8 billion for a Trans-
Canadlan-United State. pIpelIne system sUFgesta the wid.
renge or Imponderables faced by industry decision makers. 9
Transportation will remain the key problem. Technological
pro~reaa and market demands wi.ll determine the rate of
explo1 tatton. It appears obvlous that economio facts of
life will determine fUture developments.
Excellent examples of auch cost esoalation are provided
by both the trans-A1aeka pIpe11ne aystem (TAPS) and the cost
8nAlaaka Lacke Harbor for Manhattan", N.Y. lflmes Hewa
Service. Providenoe Snndal Journal, October 26, 1969, p. B48.
9William D. Smith, "Oetting Out Alaskan Oil", N.Y. Tl...~
ServIce, The ProvIdence ~ournal, 2 January 1969, p. 7:1.
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or oonatruetlon of large ioe-breaker tankers. Orip:lnal cost
estImates of $900 million tor ~APS have been esoalated to
$1.6 billion and evidence suggest. it may reaoh t2 billion
before oompletion. Original estImates or $50 million per
tanker are likewise escalating 8S additional knowledge is
acquired.
2'7
CHAPTER V
LFGAL--POLTTICAL CONSTDF.RA~IONS
nToo orten students of for~tgn arfatrs have behaved 8S
though they were the t'rustrated diplomats some aspired to be.
turning the F,lare or scholarship upon our relations with
carta!n nattons only atter those relattona have become
1
strained".
The nsture of Canadtan/U.S. relat10Dshlps was ohanping
well before the disoovery of 011 In Alaska. This change
results from a growing debate over the development of a
national senae of purpose and 8 desIre to remove Canada fram
such olose identifIcation with the United States. The faot
tbat Canada 18 the only major o~Jntry In the world wIth a
sIngle neighbor. that she 18 the second largest oountry 1n
the world yet has a total population not muoh lar~er than
metropolitan new York CIty have all oomb1ned to sIgnificantly
effect her nattonal attltudes. 2
While the auccessful transIt of the V.nhattan oould not
have been aooomplished without extensive Canadian oooper-
,~
atton and assietanoe, disturbing and emotional questions
1RobIn W. Winks, "Controllln~ Factors In Canadian-
Amerioan Relatione", The Australian Journal o~ Pol1tloB and
Ristor!, August 1968, p. 193.
aIbid., p. 200.
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have been raised. The event baa helF,htened nationalist10
!9naltivities resultIng in increased domestic pressure to
38ssert exap:gersted olaims of' sovereignty. Arguments for
the so-oalled sector principle have been revived. Assertion
of Boveretgnty over all the waters between the Canadian
Arcttc Islands by delimitation with straight base lines has
been advocated. Still others have insisted on abandonment
of the prfu,entlr asserted three mile territorial sea in
favor of a 12 mile territorial limit. Reoognizing the
importanoe of transportation to the development of their
own extensIve natural resource potential others perceive
suoh measures 88 ultimately self-defeating. Keenly aware
of the delicate eoology or the Arctio the primary oonoern
of responsible officials appears to be tbe1r ab1ltty to
oontrol the threat of pollution.
Unquestionably balio issues have been raised which were
largel,. aoademl0 prior to the Manhattan test. T.n~ible
~vid.nce of profitable exploitation has raised the apectre
of confliot over territorial rights. However, a aystem for
reFulation and oontrol muat be established without Making
the region the aoene or international disoord. 4
3Ji~ Hampton, ftA Dispute Bre.s: The Passage Port or
Canada? • Tb! Nat10nal Observer, Sept. 22, 1969, p. lIe.
4P1nn So111e, "Arotto and Antarctic - Current Problema
in the Polar Regions". C00!iratton and Oonflict. Hordic
Studies in Internat! anal Pollics, '.nua17 1969. p. 124-127.
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One of the basio issues coneerning sovereIgnty in Arctio
waters has been the unique aspect presented by an 10e
eovered sea. Elaborate arguments have been developed to
justify aooording sea ioe the same status 8S land. Since
we have already 8een that the Ice breaks up and becomes
mobile within the pa8sa~e dur1ng the summer season the
following observation would clearly apply:
The fact that the Arctic Ocean Is partly covered
with ioe, has not been aeoepted In International
Law as a reason to dtverge from the normal status
or htp.h sea., matnly beoause the ice is constantly
on the move. Here the space 'actor play. a role.
It could not oome under the sovereignty or 8 state
because It ohange. constantly, larll;8 canals and 5
open places being formed and disappearing a~aln.
The sector principle, f1 ret proolaimed by Mr. Porter 1n
1907, In the Canadian Senate and adopted by the SovIet Union
by its unilateral declaration in 1926, was intended to
establish sovereignty over islends in that .eotor whether
discovered or not. Under thIs scheme the meridians on the
east and west border of the coast l1ne of the continent, or
lslands, are extended to the pole to enolos. 8 trlsnFle of
jurisdictIon. Asid. from the raot that no nation has
sctually asserted sovereignty over waters within such.
sector, most authorlties have concluded that tht. 18 not a
5
M. W. Mouton, !he InternatIonal Reitme of the Polar
Seas, Academy of' International taw, 1.. 9{jthotf. Leyden,
l'mm', p. 201.
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reoognized doctrine or 1nternati.onal law and 1a not a
recognized method of acquisItion of territorial sovereignty.
FUrthermore, the theory has no practical importance for
Arctic regions 1n 80 far 8S the status quo ia generally
acquleeoed In by other states and Increased aerial explor-
6
ation haa not led to the discovery of additional Islands.
While it bas been argued that the Anglo-Norwegian
F18herie~ decislon haa ju.tlrl~d drawIng straight baseline.
around the entire Canadian Arcttc Archipelago in order to
declare them internal waters, at least one Canadian soholar
has submitted:
That any delimItation that olosed off the Northw.st
Passage would be contrary to tnternattonal law. It
.ould mean dI"8wlng a lIne of at least 50 mIle.
acrOBa the entrance of Lancaster Sound in the east
and another olosing line or nearly 100 miles acro••
McClure StraIt in the we.t. This .erle8 of strait.
connects the AtlantiC and the Paolr1c Ocean. In a
dIrect and olear channel of' at least 25 181.18. wloe
exoept in one plaoe Where, a. we have •••n, the
presence of a rew lalands reduoes 1t to not le88
than 15 mtles. 7
Se goes on to point out that the PrInce or Wale8 Strait 1s
the only plaoe Where Canada could logically interfere wltb
the passaFe or foreign shlps.
The
6
Ibid., p. 243-244.
-7
A. Donat Pharand, "Innooent Pa8sa~e in the Arctic",
Canadian Yearbook ot InternatIonal t.w, 1968, p. 58.
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In still another thoughtful appraIsal of Canada'. oa8e
for territoriality of Archipelago waters a legal histortan
with the CanadIan Department of IndIan Affairs and Northern
Development hAS conoluded that:
In resolving the.8 problema it 1s far more desir-
able to maintain a decent respect for Internat1 ona1
law than to attempt to bend or stretch it to serve
national ends. Two basic principles, freedom of
the h1gh s ••s and freedom or. air space above inter-
national waters, have been under severe attack 1n
recent years. Canada, 1n common with other nations,
hal far more to galn tn the long run by upholding
these prInciples than be subverting theM. This 1.
partioularly true 1n the Arctic, where what there
is to be galned 1s small compared with what there
1a to be lost In other parts of the wor1d. 8
The influence or thIs reasoninF, app~rs evIdent In the
statement of Pri_ M1n1.ster Trudeau tn the Houee of Commons
on 24 October 1969, when he stated that "to deny pas.BF.e to
all foreIgn vessels tn the nam~ of' CanadIan sovet"elgnty
would be a8 Bense1esa as placIng barriers across the
entrances to Halifax and Vancouver harbora." At the 9Ame
tIme hts statement contains ample evidence or natlona1
anxiety over po~entlal pollu~ion problems. OrferlnF 8ssur-
anoes that Canad!an pol1c.r wIll be "designed ror environ-
mental proteotton" and "will not be an intolerable
interferenoe with the acttvities of others" nor" b@ •
The
Arctic
p. 255.
8Gordon W. Smith, "SovereIgnty In the North:
CanadIan Aspect or an Internat!onal PrOblem", The
FrontIer, R. St. J. Macdonald, ed. Toronto, 19~a~6~,~--~7
restriction to progress" he alluded to "legielation"
whloh would oontribute "to the long-term and sustained
development or resouroes for eoonomio and 800ial programs."
He further suggested "a combinati. on of an international
regime end the exeroise by the Canadian government of ita
own authority in the Canadian Arctic", "to ensure that
irreparable harm w111 not oocur 8S a result of neglipent
or intentional oonduct".
The vagueness of this statement precludes speoulation
on the outline of f.orthooming proposale. However, some
evidence of current thinking in thle regard Is provIded by
the follOWing:
While the newspapers have been urging proclamations
of 8overel~t1 over the Arctic waters In various
wa,.s, the announcements of government polley to
date indicate that the Oanadian 80vernment wlll
introduce measures to oontrol pollution and related
probl..s and limit ita immediate aotion to that. In
my own opinion, .s expressed in varIous placea, It
18 not necessary to have sovereignty over particular
waters to assert a power to control, to punish, or
to prevent pollution of thoae waters, the littoral
state having suCh pollution control powera .a a
matter of ouatomal'1' InteJ-n8tlonal la" even wl thout
any formal treaty authority to do 80. 9
This statement would tend to 8UPPort a conclusion that,
while the lssue is 8 lively one for home oonsUMption, Canada
18 unlikely to impose reatrlct!ons beyond those desIgned to
92d1rerd McWhinneY'. Professor or Law and Director In8t1-
;ute or Air and Spaoe Law, MoGi11 UniversIty, Montreal
eraon.! Correspondence dated 29 October 1989. '
control pollution wIthin the 12-ml1e limit, or oontiguous
zone.
Even conc~dtng thAt International 8entlment makes
universal adoption of a l2-mlle tArt-itor!8l sea eppMr
Imminent, auen universal acoeptance would not 8iFntficantly
alter the situation. or course, all of Prince of Wa1ee
Strait and one other small sectlon of the passage, that seo-
tton of Barrow Strait contsln1ng Young And Lawthet- Islands,
88 desoribed on pa~e 14, would beoome entirely territorial
Bea, however, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the terrItorial
Bea olearly provide8 for tnnocent pasaage throUFh suCh
waters.
The aforementioned discuss10n by a Canadian scholar on
the legal status of the Northwest Pa.saFe has been summar-
ized as follows: "There Is a right of Innooent passage in
ravour or !!! ship. throughout the lforthwel!!lt P.ssage, by
virtue of general international law as 1t existed before,
and a. 1t has developed linee, the TerritorIal 8ea Convention
of 1988. n10
A recent notit1catlon by 011 Indu8tPJ official. that
fUrther tanker test. are contemplated in the 8pring have
in! t1ated a resurge of natIonal sentlmt'nt to take prompt
10Pharand, p. 60.
aetion to assert Canadian sovereignty. The External Affairs
Minister came close to such an assertion before the House
of Commone on 19 February.ll On subsequent questtontng the
Prime Minister altered the language sufficiently to demon-
strate that his pr1.mary concern 18 wi th measures to reduoe
the risk or pollution. These exchanges simply serve to
emphasize the degree of pressure, both from the public and
some members of government, being placed on Canadian
offioiais. Rising rears of' impending pollution problema
.ere reinforced when the Liberian tanker Arrow, oarrying
3.8 million gallons or. 011 grounded and broke up tn Nova
Scotia's Chedabucto Bay on 4 February. The•• events .upgeat
an urgent need for early btlateral negotiations to resolve
mutual problema before unneoessary frIotion develops.
The problema of pollution control peouliar to the
Arctio environment are quIte properly of equal concern to
the United States. Our burgeoning domeatic preoccupation
wIth artifioial deteploratton or the envIronment diotate.
conoern. "011 spills on the waters or Cook Inlet are
common, as the petroleum industry enters the production
atage. How Cook Inlet w111 react to extenalve 011 pollution
Is unknown because our documented knowledge 1s inadequate
11
___ John &rna, "'Bar 'lanker if not aare, PM Indicates",
~1_ Toronto Globe and MatI, 21 ~bruarJ-1970, p. 1:3.
to predict the behavior or a cold-water, silt-laden
estuary...12 The threat or 011 8p!.ll8 are by no means the
only problem. Plain garbage and human excrement 81'8 poten-
tial problems. GarbaF.e simply doesn't disappear unlAs8
consumed by indigenous mammals. ShIp traffic on a commer-
cial basis could generate significant problema unless
adequately controlled. Holding tanks and incinerators may
prove to be essential. "POI' example, in the Point Barrow
area, the navy and various other group. under contract for
011 exploration have accumulated a. estimated one-quarter
or a millIon drum. or human wastea because no reasible dis-
posal method is available •• • • ~-7eoes8.r7 research
must be instituted to acquIre an understanding or eco-
system dJDamlcs in the Morthland."13
In spite or an apparent unreasoned anxiety over Amerioan
domination 1n the Aretlc, manifested by strong domestIc
pressures to take aotion whIch would limit auch ambItIons,
it seems evident that responsible Canadian leadership is
trying to en8ure that logic wll1 prevail over ~motion8.
FUrthermore, it i8 d1 rtloult to conceive what u8eful purpose
12Lotspeich, Frederick B., "Water Pollution in Al••ka:
Present and Future", SCIRllCE, Deoember, 1969, Reprinted in
Senate Congressional Record, December 9. 1969, p. 816146.
13
Ibid.
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would be served even 1r an unoontested ola1m to sovereignty
over these waters could be established. Canada's ola1m to
the land seems olearly establtshed and the resources of the
extensive continental shelf which underlie these waters
could hardly be oontested.
It 1s suggested that any unilateral aotton, prior to
concrete evidence that a marine operation through the North-
west Passage can be ~ade economically feasible, could be
both selt-defeating and politically embarrassing. Even the
assertion of the limited jurisdiction necessary to control,
to punish or to prevent pollutIon would seem to imply the
responsloi 11 ty to prov! de the servi oea whioh wi 11 be
required. ~e cost of navigational aids and additional
loe-breaker support alone hes been estimat.d at tl billion
by the Canadian Minister of Trenaportatlon. l 4 Mutual con-
cern over pollution control, severe environmental challenges
and the obvious advantages to be gained by opttmlz1ng
limited tinaneial, scIentific, support and trained manpower
resources would seem to prov1 de a firm b••1s tOl' m.eanlngf'Ul
bilateral or multilateral arrangements to the mutual advant-
age of all nations with an interest 1n the Arettc.
14"0.. ruwes!. nvttes Bickel to View O!l DrIlling", The
Providence Sunday Journal, 21 Sept. 1969, p. 5-12:1.---
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As alluded to in the discussion of economl0 consider.
atlons, in the final analy81s the solution to most or these
problems wl11 b8 dictated by economlcs. A former VIce-
President and Managing Direotor or the Vining AssocIation
of Canada has suggested that if exploitation 18 to oocur,
"Capital is all important. It wtl1 be needed In quantities
beyond the capacity of Canadiana to 8upply. It iI, there-
rore, of' major importance that Canada should continue to
maintain the favorable investment cllmate that has
characterized her economy trom the earliest da18. Both
public and private oapital will be required, partlcularly
In the field of establishing transportation facilitIes.
Thi. haa been the pattern 1n the paat and 1s certainly the
key to tne ruture.~l5
An apparent fear of United States economic domination
has been generated by the flot that of lS,OOO Canadlan
oClDpanles wl th forelgn capt tal investment 7,000 are con-
trolled by Amerioana. What se8m. to be overlooked In thl.
argument 1. the fact the t whIle totalrorelgn Invf'stment In
Canada today exceeds $86 btlllon, tnoludhtg American t\lndl,
Canadian investment In the Untt8d States i. f,13 billion.
15
V.c. Wan8b~ough, "The Canadian ArctIo: A Freezer PUll
of Mlnepals", INTr:RPLAY, Apr!l 1969, p. 34.
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When the population ratio of" 10 to one 18 considered this
is a rather remarkable investment. 1S
Tn summary it seems ObV'OU8 that by m'.nlm'zlng the
potential for disoord the North American Arctic offers a
unique opportunity tor a mutually beneficial bilateral
approaen to problem resolution, environmental research,
exploration. Jmproved transportation technology and support
systems development. SUM an approach could provide the
basia for eventual multilateral/regional arrangements with
political and economio implioations for the entire inter-
national community.
16
Michael Cope. "Worried Neighbor, Canada in U.S. ShadOW",
The Providenoe Journal, 14 ~bruary 1970. p. 18:1.
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CHAPTER Vl
INFLUENCE ON ARCTIC SECURITY
"It is dirfioult to impress upon the publio and
industry at lar~e that the most essential quality of the
Arctio is not cold, or gold, or po18~ bears, but a central
position 1n the world oommunity."l As previously noted, a
point near the western entrance to the Northwest Pas8a~e is
Feographically in the oenter of the great ooncentration or
population and industry of tn. world. This central position
haa long been the key to it, strategi0 significance. Apart
from this geo~raphl0 tact the ares has had littl. intrinsI0
strategic importance In itself. It has largely been the
prIvate domain or the alrorart and the 8ubmsr!ne as milItary
planners have focused on 1t8 significanoe aa a route for
weapons delivery Iystems. Its importance has been dependent
on developments outaide tbe region itSAlf. The only major
military aotivities oondueted in the area relate to surveil-
lance and local defense. The barriers of climate, distanoe
and construction cost. have operated effeotively 1n the paat
to aeverely lim1t ita own strategic slgnifioanoe. Ita
prinoipal importancehaa historically been aa a barrier
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thereby providing defense tn depth. However, wtth the
advent of the ICBM era, techno1oFY has triumphed over
geography to the extent that the inhospitable climate and
terratn of the area no longer provide 8 seoure stJ"Btee:lc
berrier. 2
The promise of the openlng or the Arcttc to commercial
development on a major scale has slgnttloantly altered the
situation of the psstdecade. The natural wealth of the
ares dictates that exploitation w111 eventually ooeur. As
thie oocurs the strate!Tl0 importance of' the ares will
1.neresslngly be determined by the nati ons most dependent
on these resources. The importsn~e of Alaskan otl to the
United States' eoonomy has already been disoussed. Potent1s1
independence from foret~ sources of supply 18 8 faetor of'
substantIal strategio slgntf1csnoe. While we have seen that
011 produoed in this area Is not lIkely to become competittve
with that produced in the Middle East thIs newly discovered
competition to Middle Eest primacy could eventually alter
internatIonal attitudes and patterns or behavior. It could
beoome an important alternative source o~ Industria1 power
to Europe and Japan in the event or international tension
or orisis.
2 R. J. Sutherland, The Arctto Frontier, p. 277-278.
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If surface commerce develops, exploitatIon or mineral
resources by bulk carrier will naturally follow. As
dependenoe on mineral reBaurc~s from the area by other
industrialized nations increases. their coneern rer pro-
tection of thIs maritime commerce w1ll increase proportion-
ately. A need will be generated for harbor facilities,
storage areas. navigatIon systems, support vehioles and
faciII tiss whi ch will require some degree 0 r seourity.:5
The eoonomic and strateg10 s'Fnlfloanoe of the Northern
Sea Route anrl its cont1nued development, over nearly 50
"
years, by the Sov1ets, 1.s well known. There 1s every
reason to believe that expanded UfJe of this route wtl1 con-
tinue bacause of the freedom of movement it provIdes. By
gBop'.raphtc necessIty the Soviet Navy has gained valuable
experience in Arcttc operations beyond that of any other
natton. The restrlotions imposed by the environment make
surface vessels ut11lztnp, Aretta Sea Routes extremely
vulnerable. As internattonal oomm~ro~ builds up in the
restricted BerIng Streit lts strategic importanee wtll con-
t1nue to @1:'0w. The requirement to develop an Arot1o
Maritime defensive capabi11ty on the part or both the
3
Anthony Harrip:an. "Northern nefens8 Frontier", M11itan
Review. December 1969, p. 4-5.
4J •J."Laforest, "Strategio SlRn1ftcsnce o~ the NorthArn
Sea Route • U.S. Naval Institute ProoeedinS8, D~c. 1967,
p. 56-65.
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United States and Canada w1l1 be dependent on the rate of
economic exploitation and development.
Consioeration of commercial sub-surfaoe systeMs is
beyond the scope o~ this discusslon. Haw~vp.r. the
feast b1lt ty of such development haR c1..,arly b~en established.
The adventaFee to be ~a1ned indioate that their development
wl11 remain 8 function or the nbt1Ity of teohnology to
establish eoonomic feasibility. That this w131 occur 1n
the caming decades seems assured. As submarine commerce
develops 8 requirement for oontro1 and defen.lve .ystems
wtll likewise develop.
"There 18 8 quickening of interest 1n the far north.
This interest necessarIly extends to stretepic factors
tnvolvin~ the Northern reg10na and to questions conoerning
defense of land. air and BeQ alon~ 8 frozen frontier.
Military profeiBiona1s, a9 much as specta1ists 1n trans-
portatIon and 1ndustry, wIll be faoed .111 new ohallenges
as a result."5
5HBrrlp;an. "Northern Defense FrontIer", p. 8.
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CHAP~R VTI
THTERNATTONAL IMPLICATIONS
Current developments in the Arctic provide a striking
parallel to current developments in the seabed. Our trag.
mentary knowledge provides a peculiar mixture of realism
and fantasy 1n any e~rort to evaluate ruture developments.
The promise of great wealth produces potent191 oonf1ict yet
the harshness or the environment tosters a realizatIon of
the necessity for cooperation. Both th~ seabed and the
Arctio have been desoribed A8 the "last t.rontter" or mankind,
Selective exPloltation,l 1.-.., taking the espec1s1ly
valuable in order to mf'et raw materfal requirements that
cannot be more reedily met from other sources, most accur-
ately desoribes the future potentIal of both. This is what
has been happeninp; throuphout the Arcttc, even w1thtn the
USSR, Bnd thftre seems eVAry likelihood that th18 w111
conttnue. The knowledge that ext~nltve otl deposits exist,
coupled with an err~cttv. economic d~8nd, have provided the
stimuluB for developing a means ot transporting this resouroe.
The process of proven resource knowledpe and a demonstrated
economic demand followed by export from the Arctic to markets
elsewhere tn the world wl11 have IncreaslnF1y important
10eorge W. Rogers, nThe Int~rnat1onal ImpllcBtions of
ArctIc Exploitation", The Arctic Frontier, p. 295.
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international implications as demand inors88es Bnd supplIes
elsswhere diminish.
World-wide demand 1'01' natural resources will oontinue
to grow 8S n result of populatlon growth. oonttnufng tnter-
national competition and 1nor~8stng per-capita demand. The
contribution of' the Arot! 0 wlll d~pl"!nd on the abt 11ty to
produce these resources at B price p~rm1tt1ng them to be
compet1 ti ve 1n world markets and the extent to whl.oh the
more acoessible souroes become depleted. The p1'6!1ent rocus
on oil exploitation verifies this obsl"!l'vation.
Japan. supported primarily by a Manuf'scturlnp economy.
must oompete with other industrial nstions for sources of
row materials. The .ruture development of Alaska's resource
potential 18 dtrectly related to Japan's raw material
requirements. C8n8d~'s over-all trade w1th Japan has
quadrupled In the past decade and the trend ~emaln8 sharply
upward. 2
A dramatic example of other untapped resources 18 the
fabled Mary River tron ore ~eposlt8 on Baffin Island.
Exploratory drtll1ng has established 8n ore body thel'e or
hl~h enough quality to reed directly tnto the fUrnaces or
the world'. steel centers. Deposits of tungsten, leod.
zinc. nlokel and oopper are known to exist. An extended
- 2
"Opening a New FrontierK • U.S. News and World Report,
18 August 1969. p. 37.
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shipping season would have a profound effect on the mining
industries of the A~ct10 which Are st11l in the infancy
stage.
Possibilities exist wh1.ch are not now predictable. The
ability or the 'Manhattan to ne~ot18te polar pack 1ce west
of Banks Island, in the Beaufort Sea. leads to speculation
on the eventual development or a oommercial route d1rectly
across the Aretic Oc~an, bearing in mind that. in spite or
her size, the Manhattan was really only a model in terms of
commercial vessels under construction. This has Important
1.mpllcatlons for Japan with expertise in mammoth ship
construotion.
As traditional transport teohnolop.y improves, Weste~n
European markets may actively seek new sources or natural
resources to replace disappearing domestic sources. Aretic
resources should aSBume increaslny, importance In the con-
tinued ~ro.th or the developed nations of the world. Thi.
will assume indirect world-wide importanoe in rel~88inF
pressure on resources elseWhere which wtl1 become acoessib1e
to underdeveloped nations or the world. 3
One factor wh1ch must be constdered In a realistic
appraIsal o~ Aretic potential 18 the 1nares.inFo evidenoe
that the USSR 18 makIng far 1es8 {mpressive pro~e88 In
:5
Ropers, The Arettc Frontier, p. 310-311.
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Arctic development than has generally been belIeved. Her
demonstrated interest 1n MIdr1le East 011 can undoubtedly
be traoed to an !.noresstng realization of' the phyl!llcal and
economic diffioulties or exploiting Arctio resources.
Internationally the United States shares its Arctio
interest with Canada, Norway, Denmark and the USSR. Although
they do not abut the Arctic Ooean, F1nland, Sweden and
Ioeland also have a keen interest in Arettc matters. The
growing feas1btlity of resource exploitatIon w111 inevitably
expand the Interfece between nat10ns with an Arctto interest
and impact on their national and internat10nal polioies.
International cooperation in science and technology appears
essential In order to make optimum use of money and searoe,
traIned manpower.
The experience F$lned in Antarctic cooperat1on during
the past decade and the var1,ouB international cooperative
investigations oonducted dur1np, the Interne.t1on.l
GeophysloAl year provIde useful precedents tor expended
Arctio actiVity. Agencies lIke the Arctic tnstitute of
North Amer1ca, The Soott Polar Research Institute and The
International Council of Scientifio unions (tCSU) represent
expertise capable of fostering and sustaining 010S8
coordination in international Arctic research.
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CHA PTER VII I
IMPACT ON U.~. POLICY
Rapidly developing evidence of the growing econom10
and strategtc importance of the ArctIc found the Un1ted
States without an articulated Arcti0 polioy. This waB
apparently the result of preoccupat1. on wi. th Antarctioa
during the past decade and a peneral lack or appreciation
ot Arctic potential. The report or the Stratton Comm18Bion
supports this observation. "At present, only the Antarctic
progrom is formally ooordinated w1. thln the Federal structure,
but steps are underway to estab11sh a somewhat oomparable
national effort in ~~e Arctic rep10n •••• The Commission
does not believe that the consolidatIon of Polar researoh
activities 1s An immediate need of the saMe ur~ency 8S the
other elements of its reoommended or~anlzBtton plan."l
Substqntlal effort Is now underway to formulate a
Nattonal Po11o~ for Arct1c programs. On 19 Ootober 1969
the Vice-President, as ChaIrman of the Nat'onel Council on
Marlne Resources Bnd Eng'neerlng Development, snnounced a
new fi ve-po1,nt prograM to strengthen the natlods marine
I Our Natton and the Sea, Report of the Comm1ssion on
Marine gol.noe, Inglneerlng and Resources, U.S. Oovtt
Printing Office, January 1969, p. 243-244.
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science aotivltles. Included as its fifth prop,ram is:
Arctic Environmental R~8earch: Ocean related
research wtll be acoelerated on the inter-
action of man with the Arctic environment.
Arcttc r~8eBrCb activities w111 be intensi-
fied, both to permit fuller utilization of
this rapidly developing area and to insure
that such activities do not inadvertently
deprBde the Arcttc environment. Initial
emPna818 wfll be on strength~ninF and broaden-
ing Arctic research capabilities. Conatderatton
will 8lso be directed to formulattng an ov..,r-
all policy framework for Arcttc related
activltt~8 •••• Seleotion of the ftve priority
pro~ram. followed an intensive Gov~rnment-wld.
review of urpent needs of the na tion 'n relat10n
to Marine Afrat rs. Tbf'tse part! cnlar needs oannot
await the result of longer range studtes.2
On 18 November 1969, the Seoretary of the Interior pro-
posed that the Interior Department be designated lead
ap:ency to chatI' an !.nter-arency task force to formulate a
cohfltrent plan, the first draft or whIch would be ready
approximately nine months after beginning work. Once the
plan 1s completed cooperatton and assIstance would be
8ou¢lt from other nat10ns such illS Cs.nada, Denmark and the
Soviet Union.!
The stated just1, f1cat1 on for thIs proposal was based
on the present lack o~ "clear-cut leadersh'tp in Arcttc
Matters" and the fact that stewardship or ftmoet or the
lands", "mueh of the waters" and the "mineral r~80t1reea"
the
2Senate Congressional Record, 21 Ootober 1969, P. 812862.
:5Letter from Seo'y of the Int~rlor to the PresIdent or
United States dated 18 November 1969.
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of both the land and the vest cont!nental shelf 18 the
direct responsibility or the Department of Interior,
On 2 December 1969, the Seoretary of the Navy forwarded
a counter-proposal that 8S an interim measure the role of
the existing Tnter-ap-ency Arctic Researoh Coordinating
Committee be expanded to incorporate all phases of Arctic
development planning.· This recommendation was baaed on
the belIef that the creation of 8 new 1nter-8~eno1 task
force at this time 18 premature. That it would be imprudent
to undertake a oomprehensive U.S. plan for the Arcttc before
a number of important international legsl and polItical
problema are solved. These include international aFreement
on the breadth of the territorial sea and the seaward limit
or the oontinental ahelf. Reoogn1z1ng the present tnsta-
bility of the poll tt cs1 81tuat1 on the Seoretory or the
Navy 1a conoerned that th~ publicity resulting from the
oreation of 8. new U.S. governmental group could result in
increased domestic pressure on the Canadian government to
assert jurisdictional cla1ma which m1~ht prejudlcfl future
development.
The languaf!;8 of" the Interior proposal s e ...ms to indicate
a preoccupation w1.th developmental planning 1n Arctic
4Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the President
of the United StateR, dated 2 December 1969.
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Alaska while the Navy proposal is properly concerned with
the broader aspects of Arctic development and the import-
ance of the Arctic a8 a defense frontier. The Tnter-aFency
Arctic Research Coordinating CommIttee whlch oonstitutes an
eX1st1ng vehtcle for Arcttc development planning 18 chaIred
by the National Sci enee Foundation and includes 1n its
membership representatives rrom the Ofrtc~ of "eval ReSe8l'"oh,
Army, Air Foroe, Coast Guard, Atom1c Energy Commission, and
the Departments of Intertor, State, Apr1oulture, Commerce
and Health Education and Welfare. The Nattonal Science
Foundation already has responsibility for and extensive
exper!tmce 1n the formulation of po1tcy and proFrBms in
Antarctica.
The chal1en~e8 which face Federal apenc!es, the State
of Alaska, industry and the soientific and engineering
oommunities are penerating studies and related activIties
acr08S a broad front. In a press rel~ase or 2! Aupust 1968,
the Secretary of Transportation stated In part "The Depart-
ment of Transportation w111 investigate the feasibility of
extendln~ the shipping seB80n eo 8S to permtt deve1opm~nt
of ocean transportation to and from Arcttc A1Aska.~ The
ort1c~ of Naval Rese.rch, under projeot TIAPA, i8 oonduct-
ing s comprehensive examinetion of th~ Navy's potentIal
roles and mIssions in th~ Arctic. An evaluation of NoV1
Arettc research and a long ran~e plan for future research
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has been prepared by Q 8cientlstrrom the Naval Undersea
Warfare CAnter, San Diego. The Nat10nal Science Foundation
Is planning the inittation of an Arcttc Research Progrem.
The Committee on Polar Research of ~he National Academy or
Soiences, has In prop-ress an appraisal or lonp' r8n~e plans
for each or the ~• .1or so1fmttf10 d18ctp11nes. 5
The National Council on Mertne Resources and Enp1neer-
tng development tn its third report to the Congress dated
J8nua~ 17, 1969, deve1Qped the outline for a National
Arctic polloy and suggested proF,rsms to promote suoh a
polioy. '!'hie statemfl'!nt ref1eots a keen appreciation of
Aretic prob1eme and subetant1ates the attractivene8s or
international cooperation 1n Arctic developmental p1annIng. 6
Economio constraints, severe envIronmental barriers
and a paucity of trained manpower oomblne to sugpest the
necessity for planning innovations tn both the public and
private sector, if sign1f1 cant progress 19 to be aohieved.
High level ooor11natlon appears essential to th~ tntelll~ent
direotion of effort. Inter-a~ency rivalries or ambItions
5Robert A. Frosch, C1081ng addresB, ProcfIledlnp's of the
U.S. Naval Arcttc Research Laboratory, Dedication Symposium,
Fairbanks, Alaska, 9-12 April, 1969. ARCTIC, Journal of the
Arctic Institute of North America, Sept. 1069, p. 382.
SMartn. Soleno Affairs - A Year of Broadened Partiol-
Ration, The fhird leport of the PresIdent to the Congress on
l'Iirlne Resources and Enp!.neering Development, U.S. Gov't
Printing Offioe, Washington, D.C., January 1969, p. 144.
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must be prevented from developtnF into thtnly d18FUleed
attempts to aohieve single agent proponency in Arctic
matters. Inter-industry competition should not result In
the expenditure of substantial amounts of. private cepital
wlthout an appropriate return in teohnological knowled".e
end expertise. Nat1.onal rivalries should not be permitted
to generate shortsighted internetional policy assertions
to the eventual detriment or enll~~tened. long term progress.
The manifold problems in Arctic exploitation appear to
provide an unpreoedented opportunity for meBnlngrul
bilateral cooperation between tne United States and Canada.
Deliberate and fully coordinated p18nnln~ by responsIble
representatives of both government and industry s@eme
essent18l to prevent unwarranted r.rletton or conflict and
to provide the bost. ror attracting sufficient prIvate
capital to susta1n developm~nt.
Canada has a large area or Arctic territory and a
compe.rittvely amall population to explore and exploit it.
It appears very much in her Interest to enoourage bilateral
oooperation in the north. The Advisory Oomml ttee on
Northern Development 18 responsible ~or advising the
Canadian government on questIons of pol1 cy relati ng to
northern Canada and providing for the effectIve coordination
of all ~overnment aotivities there. This body and the U.S.
Inter-ageney Arctic Research Coordinating Committee could
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CHAPTFR IX
CONCLUSTONS AND RECOMMENrATTONS
Conolusions developfl'ld in this study may be 8ummarh:ed
88 follows:
Although past prophecies of Arotic development have
ht8to~loally tended to underestimate the physical bar~ler8
imposed by the environment and current efro~ts suggest 8
continuation of this tendency. the development of a oommer-
olally feasible North.est Passage Is olearly in the
notional tnterest of both the United States and Canada.
Such a route would provide the oapability to exploit mineral
resources or the Arctic in 8Uppo~t of the nettonal economy.
provide an alternative trade route to the strategically
vulnerable Panama Canal and provide the potential tor tne
eventual development of signifioantly shortened Inter-
national trade routes.
The Manhattan transit waa a suoce•• In terms of test
objectives and an important tentattve step in the develop-
ment of a transportation system. FUrther test1n~ ts
required durIng the wInter season to establIsh eoonomic
feasibility before a deois1on can be made re~ard1ng oon-
struction or the expensive loe-br~aker tankers which would
be r~qu1red. or the alternatives oons1dered In transport-
In~ Alaakan 011 the ~oonomtes o~rered by Martne Burface
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transportation make this option the most attractive in
terms of oapital commitment. The odds that 1~.r round
feasibility cen be conclusively demon.treated appear
tenuous at this time. Regardless of the outoome, these
tests w111 have important application 1n the eventual
exploitation of Arcttc resources with le8s critioal 8tor-
age problema or wblch could be transported during a shorter
navigation 88880n.
Transportation 9t.ll remaIn the principal problem 1n
~ ~
the exploitation of Arctic resouroes In the t'or~8eeab18
ruture. lb:plo1 tation will 1nevi tably occur but the tre-
mendous capital required will fUnction to retard the rate
'.'l-
of development which will remain dependent on; market
demand, the ability of teohnology to produce and transport
these resourcea at prioes competitive In world markets,
and the extent to whIch aore acces8ible sources become de-
plated. Without the dual incentives or United States
demand for petroleum products and the ~8ubBld18." provided
by current petroleum polictes even Arctic 011 eould not yet
be competitively produced.
Current national and tnternettonal attItudes re~erdtng
negl1F,ent or Intenttonel damage to the environment, com-
btned with only fragmentary knowledFe of the delicate
eoology of the Arctic, dictate the establishment of pro-
cedures ror the efrective prevention and control of poten-
tial pollution probl~ms.
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In conformanoe with the Terr1torial Sea Convention of
1958 and g~neral internatIonal law, a right or. innocent
passage presently exists throughout the Northwest Passage.
Because of long-range national economic oonsiderations
and significant international implications the assertion
of 80vereigntr over the waters between the Canadian Arctic
Ielands would be detrimental to long-term Canadian Arctic
development. In spite of atronf. domesttc pr~88Urea to the
contrary, responsible Canadian leadership .111 oonttnue to
reslst imposing restrictions beyond measures to control
polhltlon within the contiguous zone.
The Magnitude or proven 011 depo8ita alone have
8ignlflcantly altered the 8trate~lc importance of the
Arcttc. As systematic exploration, location and identifica-
tion of natural resource. progresse8 its Internattonal
strategic Importance wIll inorease In direct proportion to
the economic dependenee of individual nations on theee re-
sources. However, the severe environmental chal1enFes of
this "r.rontter" .t11 necessitate the cooperation of mili-
tary, sclent! flc, technological end 1ndustri.al professionals
in order to optimize limited manpower and capt tal in the
realization of this economic potential.
Because or the multiplIcity of nattonal Inter-aFency
interests and broad internat10nal implications a unique
opportunl ty 18 prov1 ded for Innov8t~ons 1n coordinated
5'7
Arctio policy formulation and bilateral developmental plan-
ning. Any sense or urgenoy which could lead to a narrowly
conceived or ultimately restrictive poltcy should be avoided
by both the United States and Canada. The potential rewards
or an effective and mutually supporting arrangement are
olearly attainable.
Reoommendat1 ons:
As an interim measure pending a deoision by the petro-
leum industry regarding the tronsportat1on of 011 to the
Eaatern United States 1t is recommended that:
- The role or the Inter-agenoy Arcttc Reaearoh
Ooordinating Oommittee be expanded, 8S reoommended by
the Secretary of the Nevy, to inoorporate all ph.Rea of
ArctIc development planning and to monitor .tudies alreAdy
underwa,. to insure economy of effort. '!'his committee
rep:reaents every existing Federal agenoy provtdl ng fundlny.
tor Arctic reaearoa and development. Concurrently, these
eleven Federal agencies, with responsibilities for Arctic
.rrairs, should pursue the nine point programl outlined by
the Merine Sciences Council, under the coordination ot the
Arctic Coordinating Committee. Additionally thftse agenct.s
should be encouraged to provide support end assistanoe, 8.
1
v.r!ne Science Affairs, January 1969. p. 145-146.
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practioable, to private industry 1n the resolution ot trans-
portatton problema.
Aa a long term solutton to problema of ArctIc develop-
mentsl planning it 18 reoommended that:
- The formation ot a bilateral -North American Arctic
Development Council" be proposed. The U.S. ArctIc Researoh
Coordinating Committee and the Canadian Advisory Committee
on Northern Development could f"orm the nucleus of this
organlzllt1.on. ChaIrmanship should be rotational as agreed
between the members. '!'he f'unction of th1 e oouno11 would
be the atjmulat10n of both public and private tnveatment
through the resolution or mutual problems, the coordinat~d
plann1ng of environmental researoh, resource looation,
identifioation and exploitation, improved trRnaportation
technology and support and defense systems development.
Thts body could eventually be expanded into 8 "R8~lonal
Aretio Development Counc11" to incorporate membership ot
all nations wIth an tnterest tn Arctic arfaire.
The decision of the petroleum Induatrr wIll have a
slgnifIoant lmpaot on the aFenda of the proposed organiza-
tion. Ir economic ~easlbl11ty of eitner a surface or
sub-surface tanker system Is demonstrated, leading to the
planned con8t1"U~tton or shipa , early resolutlon or procedures
1'or pollut:l on control and plannlnp for development of support
system. wIll be required. If, on the other hand, current
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errorta are discarded in tlvor of a pipe-line eyatem future
dev~lopment or commercial transportation within or through
the Northwest Passage wl11 be retarded. Nevertheless,
ooordinated plannln~ ror the eventual expansion of Inter-
nattonal trade wIll be required. The proposed orpenlzatlon
can be tailored to requirements generated by the rate of
development yet prov1de the coordination essential to the
tntell1p,ent allocation or both publ!c and private resourcea.
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